I think he says modestly I got towards what I was after "I think," he says modestly, "I got towards what I was after. This is as close to keeping my eye on the ball as I can get at the moment." He is now considering ways of pulling together the unusually formatted series in a single publication, and is working - at last - towards a new full-length graphic novel.He has also been spending time in Europe - we met at a comics festival in Berlin. The New York Times never even responded to his offer of a strip; The New York Review of Books rejected what it saw with the opaque comment: "This would be great for Europe." Eventually, "In the Shadow of No Towers" was commissioned by the German newspaper, Die Zeit - whose editor, Michael Naumann, is an old friend and admirer.But that was all the encouragement that Spiegelman needed. "In the Shadow of No Towers" has now been going for 10 episodes (six of which are reproduced here), in a loosely chronological sequence that takes us from the original attacks to "victory" in Iraq and beyond, and is now notionally complete. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), chaired by the Labour MP Ann Taylor, also criticised the Government's dossier on the Iraqi threat, concluding that key claims should have been omitted or heavily qualified.The ISC's report put further pressure on Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence, accusing him of giving "unhelpful and potentially misleading evidence" on the extent of dissent within the MoD about the dossier.But the political spotlight switched firmly to Mr Blair himself after the ISC revealed for the first time details of a briefing he received from intelligence chiefs in the run-up to the war.As MPs prepared to vote on the war on 18 March, he even said that links between Iraq and al-Qa'ida were hardening. Another of Tony Blair's main justifications for war on Iraq was blown apart yesterday by the disclosure that intelligence chiefs had warned that deposing Saddam Hussein would increase the risk of terror attacks on Britain.
The Prime Minister told Parliament and the public earlier this year that the West had to act against Baghdad to prevent chemical and biological weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.But exactly two years after al-Qa'ida's 11 September attack, a committee of MPs revealed that the Mr Blair had been told that the threat from Osama bin Laden "would be heightened by military action against Iraq". This has now been disclosed to the MPs in the committee, but not senior officials in the intelligence community. The very fact that the ISC has in effect dismissed the 45-minutes claim indicates that this second piece of intelligence was also less than credible.. These officials were deeply sceptical of the claim from MI6 that their single source for the 45 minutes claim was credible.Dr Jones pointed out at the Hutton inquiry that the information had actually come second-hand, and that the original informant could not give basic details about whether the threat was from chemical or biological weapons, as well as the suspicion that he may have been trying to influence British intelligence rather than inform.The committee claimed yesterday that the single source was suddenly supported by fresh intelligence so rare that only the heads of the services were allowed to see it. It was at the inquiry that the seniority of those unhappy with the dossier, such as Dr Jones, emerged for the first time. But ultimately, putting 45 minutes in a military context when this was going through, I had to make a corporate decision on which draft we would actually live with. So the fact that this discussion goes on was just a weekly event as far as I was concerned - lively debate within the DIS."VERDICTAlthough the ISC is critical of the failure by Mr Hoon and his senior officials to be candid about the two letters of protest, the report does not really address the crucial point of widespread dissension within the intelligence community.The ISC only found out about the disquiet in the ranks because of the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. We have seen that intelligence and understand the basis on which the CDI [chief of Defence Intelligence] and JIC took the view they did."The CDI, Air Marshal Sir Joe French, told the committee: "For each paper I would have the range of specialists who have been involved in them, obviously splitting hairs on particular words.
The report stated: "We were told that there was further intelligence of a nature so sensitive that it was only released on a very restricted basis. This is not excused by the genuine belief within the DIS that the concerns had been expressed as part of the normal lively debate that often surrounds draft JIC assessments within the DIS."We are disturbed that after the first evidence session, which did not cover all the concerns raised by the DIS staff, the Defence Secretary decided against giving instructions for a letter to be written to us outlining the concerns."The committee, however, failed to take evidence from the two DIS members. In his evidence, he claimed that the letters "were not regarded by the DIS [Defence Intelligence Staff] as representing formal complaints about the text used in the draft dossier as the drafting process was, at the time, still continuing."We regard the initial failure by the MoD to disclose that some staff had put their concerns in writing to their line managers as unhelpful and potentially misleading. Before this appearance, the Defence Secretary supplied the committee with copies of the letters. The report stated: "These letters had also been copied to the then DCDI, but not to the Defence Secretary or the JIC chairman."The ISC was so concerned that they recalled Mr Hoon for further questioning. However, the report stated: "The Defence Secretary told us that 'there had been a dispute' in the context of the 45 minutes claim about whether it was better to say that the intelligence was 'showing' or 'indicating'."The Defence Secretary did not tell us that two members of the DIS had written with concerns. Nor did his officials, even when pressed on the matter, after the Defence Secretary had left."The ISC was subsequently informed about the letters of complaint by Dr Jones and his colleague by Martin Howard, the deputy chief of Defence Intelligence. In particular they were deeply sceptical of the claim, second-hand, from a single source, that Saddam could launch chemical and biological attacks within 45 minutes.This was known to Mr Hoon when he appeared before the committee on 22 July. "Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to mainland UK, nor did the dossier say so."As we said in our analysis of the JIC assessments, the most likely chemical and biological munitions to be used against western forces were battlefield weapons(artillery and rockets), rather than strategic weapons."VERDICTThe alleged current and imminent threat posed by Saddam was central to the decision to go to war rather than let the United Nations inspectors continue with their work. It was unfortunate that this point was removed from the published version of the foreword and not highlighted elsewhere."The report repeated the lack of immediate threat to this country. The first draft of the Prime Minister's foreword contained the following sentence: 'The case I made is not that Saddam could launch a nuclear attack on London or another part of the UK (he could not) ...'"This shows that the Government recognised that the nature of the threat that Saddam posed was not directly to mainland UK. This was actually stated in a draft of the dossier, but then taken out of the version published on 24 September.The report said: "Saddam was not considered a current or imminent threat to mainland UK, nor did the dossier say so. This was crucial in buttressing the government claim that Iraq was a direct threat to British citizens.However the committee points out that the 45 minutes allegation, which came to MI6 second-hand from a single source, related not to strategic missiles like al-Hussein at all, but limited-range battlefield weapons such as artillery and mortars and short-range rockets.The report points out that there was nothing new in these claims of Iraq's ability to use chemical or biological weapons in such limited capacity.SADDAM THREATThe ISC report states in two separate sections that Saddam was not a current or imminent threat to mainland UK. |
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